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Abstract: After waiting nearly 13 years to become member of the European Union (EU), the United 
Kingdom, by the referendum in June 2016, it wants to be the first country leaving the European 
construction structures. However, the manner by which it was decided to exit the EU, namely the 
“referendum” raises many legal constitutional debates within the United Kingdom, even to the 
admission of the possibility to invoke the nullity of the vote of the British people. However, the 
London Government reaffirmed their desire to abandon the European ship. Thus, engaging the 
technical procedures for negotiating the conclusion of exiting from the EU cannot be sustained for too 
long. However, the future relationship between the European Union and Britain gives rise to many 
uncertainties. It puts in question the type of framework agreement which will regulate the cooperation 
between the EU and the UK. Maybe it will take as a model the existing agreement, such as that 
between the Union and the Switzerland or Russia, or it will be preferred the agreement “sur mesure” 
(customized) according to their interests? Also, another question is that of knowing the effects of 
exiting, in terms of international relations. The European Union is party to various international 
treaties, the United Kingdom, through its membership, has enjoyed the benefits of these international 
agreements. Since the Union is no longer serving as interface, should Britain renegotiate bilaterally 
these treaties? To all these questions we will give an objective answer in this article.  
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“What is an indignant man? A man who says no. “And what is “no”? “This “no” 
asserts the existence of a border”. With these questions it began the essay 
“L’homme révolté” Albert Camus, Nobel Prize in literature of 1957. (Camus, 1985, 
p. 27) 
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On June 23, 2016, following a consultative referendum, 51.9% of UK nationals 
told “no” to the European Union (EU), deciding to withdraw from the 28 member 
states and thus creating a border. 
Consequently, we can say that almost 52% of Britons are indignant and believe 
(for various reasons: political, legal, institutional) as their kingdom should be 
independent. 
 
1. Introductory Considerations 
The decision of the British people can be considered a paradox since, seeing itself 
as marginalized by the two major world powers after the Second World War (USA 
and USSR), it wants to unite in the early 1960s with new construction Europe. 
Facing a veto of General de Gaulle, the British people had to wait for his 
disappearance and organize a referendum in France by President Pompidou in 
April 1972 for the United Kingdom to join the EU on January 1, 1973. 
From the outset, Britain wanted a privileged status among the Member States. 
Thus, in 1979 the prime minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, requested and 
obtained a decrease in the British contribution to the European budget.1 
Governments in London, consistently preferred to maintain and develop relations 
with Washington and NATO (NATO) in Brussels and the construction of a 
European defense. Also, as for the free movement, the British people have not 
ratified the Schengen agreement, and in matters of monetary policy it refuses the 
single European currency, the Euro. On the occasion of the European summit on 
9th December 2011, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, by its Prime Minister 
David Cameron opposes signing the pact budget on the grounds of protecting the 
“attractiveness” of the country. Finally, as a last act before the referendum, in 
February 2016 the UK get a new status within the Union, strengthening the quality 
of primus inter pares.2 
However, there are legal consequences of this output, what steps should be 
followed and, especially, what are the effects of the “British exit” (Brexit) on the 
rights of European citizens and on the British. 
To these questions we will try to answer in the following text. 
                                                          
1 Currently the contribution is the 4th after France, Germany and Italy, and it represents 0.23% of the 
British GDP, see (Marty, 2016, p. 554). 
2 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/. 
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2. The Constitutionality of British Referendum 
Article 50, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty or TEU), 
which entered into force on 1 December 2009, it provides that “any Member State 
may, in accordance with its constitutional rules, to withdraw from the Union.” 
Ratified by the Parliament of Great Britain on 18 June 2008 (Romania ratifying it 4 
February 2008)1, in the doctrine the question remains whether the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions on the right of the British to withdraw may apply. (Constantinesco, 
2016, p. 530) 
Specifically there are two issues. Firstly, according to the constitutional rules, 
Britain may withdraw from the EU, and secondly, which legislative power has the 
will of the people expressed through the referendum in the light of parliamentary 
sovereignty (“Parliamentary sovereignty”). 
The Constitution of the United Kingdom is a set of unencrypted constitutional rules 
(i.e. not reunited within a single legislative corpus), which have two main sources: 
the Legislation (or the “enacted Law”) and jurisprudence (“Judicial precedent” or 
“case Law”). (Bredley & Ewing, 2011, p. 12) 
Among the texts with constitutional value we can include: Magna Carta Libertatum 
12152; Petition of Right of 16283; Bill of Right and Claim of Right in 16894; Acts 
of Settlement of 1701 that organizes the throne; Parliament Act of 1911, as 
amended in 1949, the regulation of the two houses (House of Lords and House of 
Commons); Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 that sets the conditions for dissolving 
the House of Commons. 
Of course, the text of paragraph 1 of Article 50 of the Treaty uses the expression 
“in accordance with its own constitutional norms” and, even in the absence of a 
written constitution it can be permissible the value of the constitutional rules of law 
mentioned above.  
                                                          
1 https://www.mae.ro/node/1532?page=2. 
2 This king (John without land) gives up to certain prerogatives in favor of barons and communes. 
3 The Legal Petition represented the protest against the king in terms of imposing taxes without the 
consent of Parliament, arbitrary criminal conviction, the use of martial committee in peacetime and 
allocation of housing in detriment of private soldiers. 
4 The Great Revolution of 1688 led not only to the fall of kings James II of England and James VII of 
Scotland, and the establishment of English constitutional monarchy in agreement with the 
fundamental rights of citizens and residents. 
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However, taking into account the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, 
(Loveland, 2009, p. 22 and the next) there is no constitutional control in the UK, 
and the Parliament reserves the right to change through a simple law the kingdom’s 
institutions and citizens’ fundamental rights. 
In a similar vein, article 2, paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that the 
“national sovereignty belongs to the Romanian people, who exercise through its 
representative bodies (...) and by referendum”. We can see that Romanian citizens 
exercising sovereignty either indirectly, by delegation, or directly through 
referendum. 
As shown above, the sources of British unwritten constitutional norm is the law 
and jurisprudence. And according to the constitutional tradition in Britain, 
sovereignty does not belong to the British citizens, as it is for the Romanian or 
French citizens for instance1, but to the Queen in Parliament or The Crown in 
Parliament. 
The term “queen in parliament” is a technical one, belonging to the constitutional 
law of the Commonwealth.2 It is characterized by the fusion of powers into the 
hands of the monarch, thus being in contradiction with the Montesquieu's 
developed system on the separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial 
power). Specifically, the Act of Parliament that passes the two chambers is sent for 
approval by the “Royal Assent”, which, once ratified, the “Act of Parliament” 
becomes law. It is similar to Article 77 of the Constitution which provides that 
laws are sent for promulgation to the President3. But we should mention that the 
President, in Romania, is elected directly by the citizens for a term of 5 years.4 
                                                          
1 Art. 3, para. 1 of the French Constitution: „La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui 
l’éxerce par se représentants et par la voie du référendum (...)/The national sovereignty belongs to 
the people who exercise it by their representatives and by means of the referendum”. 
2 Commonwealth of Nations represents the community of 16 countries that have Queen Elizabeth II as 
head of state, they are lead according to the monarchy constitution and they share the same line of 
succession to the throne. 
3 Art. 77 of the Romanian Constitution: “(1) The law is sent for promulgation to the President of 
Romania. The promulgation of the law shall be no later than 20 days after receipt. (2) Before 
promulgation, the President may ask the Parliament once the reconsideration of the law. (3) If the 
President urged the reconsideration of the law or if he asked the verification of the constitutionality, 
its promulgation is made within 10 days of receiving the law passed after reexamination or receipt of 
the decision of the Constitutional Court, by which it was confirmed its constitutionality”. 
4 Art. 83, paragraph 1 of the Constitution: “The mandate of the President of Romania is of five years, 
being exercised from the date of the oath”; Art. 81, par. 4 of the Constitution: “No person may be 
President of Romania for more than two mandates. They can also be consecutive.” 
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In conclusion, in the United Kingdom, citizens have no sovereign power on the 
Parliament and, in consequence, and in the ratio of parliamentary law and the 
referendum law, the balance is always inclined towards the parliamentary law. 
Thus, the referendum has only a consultative value, being seen at least as a moral 
biding of government.1 
Therefore, invoking Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon returns to the British 
Parliament, namely the House of Commons, which may or may not take into 
account the outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016. Moreover, according to 
the British tradition, such a consultation shall be based on the rules set by the 
“Political parties, Elections and Referendums Act” of 20002. The referendum in 
June 2016 was organized according to “European Union Referendum Act” in 
December 2015, but it does not specify the effects that a referendum produces. 
However, the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, announced on November 18, 
2016 in a press conference in Berlin3, and despite the pressure of British MPs4, it 
will ask the European Council to apply the Article 50 of the Treaty in late March 
2017. 
Unwilling to limit ourselves strictly to a constitutional analysis, without presenting 
the other legal consequences of Britain leaving the EU, we cannot move forward 
without noticing the problem raised by the doctrine in respect of the authority with 
which the British Prime Minister, May, made this announcement. (Gerkrath, 2016, 
p. 541) 
The British “constitutional” Rules say, as we have seen, that the Parliament is able 
to make notice of withdrawal in accordance with the principle “the Queen in 
Parliament” and hence of sovereignty thereof (“Parliamentary sovereignty”) 
followed then to adopt an “Act of Parliament”. But through the premier voice, 
                                                          
1 However, referendum, as conceived in the United Kingdom, does not affect Parliament’s legal 
sovereignty. While the opinion of the people may be regarded as morally biding on government, 
Parliament’s sovereignty is preserved through regarding the result of referendum as not legally 
binding the government or Parliament”. (Barnett, 2000, p. 260) 
2 The recourse to the procedure of the referendum is rare in the United Kingdom, only three 
referendums took place so far: the first concerned the maintenance of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1975, the second one in 2011, aiming the voting system in parliamentary 
elections and, the third one in 2016 on the desirability of remaining in the EU. 
3 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3949016/Theresa-turns-cheek-PM-meets-Angela-Merkel-
EU-leaders-Berlin-Brexit-negotiations-threaten-turn-nasty.html. 
4 http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-21424592-brexit-mai-multi-conservatori-cer-theresei-
may-renunte-recursul-fata-curtii-supreme.htm. 
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London's government claims the authority citing this as “Royal Prerogatives”1) in 
the case of foreign affairs. 
All these constitutional issues are to ask ourselves whether after the agreement to 
withdraw from the EU, Britain can invoke before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg the nullity based on article 46 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties in May 19692, that is the non-compliance 
of the national law on its willingness to engage. (Gerkrath, 2016) 
We will develop next the concept of “withdrawal agreement” from the Union, the 
implications of its implementation and what legal mechanisms will be undertaken 
in the near future in the UK-EU relation. 
 
3. Agreement to Withdraw from the Union 
“A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of 
its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the 
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking into account the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with 
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” (art. 50, para. 2 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon). 
According to the international law3, for one of the Member States can withdraw 
from a treaty a fundamental change of circumstances should occur. As we can see, 
                                                          
1 “Royal Prerogatives” is a means by which certain powers of the executive power shall be exercised 
by the Government. Established by Magna Carta, this means was originally practiced only by the 
monarch, without consulting the Parliament. After accession to the throne of the House of Hanover 
(predecessor of Stuart dynasty), “the royal prerogative” was practiced with the advice of the Prime 
Minister or the Cabinet, themselves being accountable to the Parliament. 
2 Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention: “(1) A State may invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a 
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding the competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
its internal law of fundamental importance. (2) A violation is manifest if it would be objectively 
evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith” 
3 Article 62, line 1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention regarding the treaties: “A fundamental change of 
circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a 
treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential 
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the European law by reference to Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon does not 
impose any condition, forcing the state to only a formal requirement, namely to 
“notify the European Council of its intention.” 
So, based on article 50, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, any of the 28 
EU Member States may decide to withdraw under the condition of respecting the 
national constitution and the notification of the European Commission. 
On the Brexit's occasion, it was raised the question of knowing when the 
Commission should be announced on this decision, because there is a legal gap in 
the Treaty on this aspect. 
Part of the doctrine (Gerkrath, 2016) proposed an answer in the light of Article 4, 
paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon1. Thus, according to the principle of loyalty 
between the EU states, all the Member States and individual countries must “adopt 
any general or particular measure in order to ensure the fulfillment of the 
obligations arising from treaties”, including the duty to notify the European 
Commission on the decision to leave the European Union. However, in the absence 
of the term determined by the law, applying the “reasonable term” is it in 
consonance with the British legal tradition and European norm? In addition, can 
the reasonable term for instance exceed six months?  
In fact, the Britain's prime minister announced that he would notify the 
Commission at the end of March 2017. So what is the next step for United 
Kingdom for leaving the European Union? 
The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon provide 
that after notice, “the Union shall negotiate and conclude” with the state from 
which it wants to come out, an agreement setting out the conditions for withdrawal 
“in view of its future relations with the Union”. It should be noted that the 
withdrawal agreement shall be negotiated and concluded by the Council of Europe, 
in the name and on behalf of the Union, “deciding with the qualified majority after 
the approval of the European Parliament.” 
                                                                                                                                                   
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) The effect of the change is 
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” 
1 Article 4, line 3, of Lisbon Treaty “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and 
the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives.” 
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Another aspect was provided in the Article 50 and which must be specified is that 
the Lisbon Treaty does not apply to the notified state starting from “date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, after 
two years of notification (...) “(art. 50, par. 3, TEU). 
In a contrario interpretation, the negotiation and the non-signing of agreement 
within two years make obsolete all the points discussed up to that point. Of course, 
delaying negotiations lead to an infringement of the Treaty relating to the principle 
of loyal cooperation and the obligation of Member States to facilitate the 
achievement of the Union's tasks and to abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of its objectives (Article 4, para. 3 TEU). The State 
wishing to leave is EU member until signing the treaty or passing the 2 year period. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty and given the opportunity of the Member State and the 
European Council to extend the term of two years by mutual agreement. The 
Treaty does not say how many times it can be made or how long, but we can 
assume that, in the absence of reliable data, it is applied the rule of tacit 
reconditioning, i.e. a period of two more years. 
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon on the withdrawal of a Member State of the 
Union has in its content that the withdrawal agreement “was negotiated in 
accordance with Article 218 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”. 
So, according to the text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the 
agreements, including the withdrawal of the Union and third countries shall be 
negotiated and concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 
218 of the Treaty1. Specifically, in the light of the expressis verbis provisions of 
                                                          
1 Art. 218, par. 1-6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Article 300 TEC): (1) Without 
prejudice to the specific provisions laid down in Article 207, agreements between the Union and third 
countries or international organizations shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the 
following procedure. (2) The Council shall authorize the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating 
directives, authorize the signing of agreements and conclude them. (3) The Commission, or the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy where the agreement envisaged 
relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy, shall submit 
recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorizing the opening of 
negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union 
negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. (4) The Council may address directives to the 
negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be 
conducted. (5) The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorizing the 
signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force. (6) The 
Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision for concluding the agreement. 
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paragraph 3 of Article 218 in conjunction with paragraph 2, sentence II and III of 
Article 50, the European Commission, on behalf of the Union, shall make 
recommendations to the EU Council (Council ministers or the Council), after 
which it “adopts a decision authorizing the opening of negotiations and it 
designates, depending on the agreement envisaged, the negotiator or the head of 
the Union's negotiating team.” 
However, during the negotiations of the Council may address directives to the 
negotiator and the right to constitute a special committee, the negotiations being 
conducted in consultation with it. 
Finally, on a proposal from the designated negotiator or head of negotiating team, 
the Council adopts a decision authorizing the signing of the agreement to withdraw 
from the EU. 
It should be noted that the European Parliament is informed of its developments 
throughout the process of concluding the agreement. 
The doctrine has wondered what kind of “British exit” will it be, a “soft” or a 
“hard” one (Guillard, 2016, p. 537). Also, we wonder which will be the fate of the 
agreement between Britain and the European Union on 18 to 19 February 2016.1 
Before giving the answer to the first question, we wish to make a brief presentation 
of the agreement of February 2016 because it “was seen as a waiver of the 
constitutive and historic values and principles of the Union from 27 states in favor 
of David Cameron (the British Prime Minister at the time).” (Monjai & Jean-
Monnet, 2016, p. 545) 
Thus, by concluding the agreement with the European Union, the United Kingdom 
is authorized not to adopt the euro single currency and to keep its British pound 
(Protocol no 15). Also, it is allowed not to join the Schengen area (Protocol no 15) 
and exert control at the internal borders and external European space (Protocol no 
20). Great Britain is entitled to the free will to implement the measures in the area 
of freedom, security and justice (Protocol no 21). Finally, it is entitled to no longer 
apply a large number of rules and provisions of the Union in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Article 10, paragraphs 4 and 5 Protocol no 36). 
                                                          
1 www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/european-council/2016/02/EUCO-Conclusions_pdf/. 
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Being considered as a sum of compromises from all 27 Member States towards the 
United Kingdom in order to avoid its exit from the Union, in the end, after the 
outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016, the agreement from 18 to 19 February 
2016 will probably never find its application. 
However, what will be the path which will be followed after the Britain’s exit of 
the European Union. 
 
4. The Future of Great Britain and of European Union 
In the absence of a position of the London government the doctrine has considered 
two possible scenarios: “hard Brexit” and “soft Brexit”. (Guillard, 2016, p. 537) 
In the event of a “hard Brexit”, the rules of EU law do not apply to Great Britain, 
launching a legislative gap in the British National law that needs to be filled. Also, 
obstructing the access to the common market and the end of free movement of 
persons and services are among the consequences of “brutal” separation. However, 
restoring the customs duties and related fees in trade relations with EU member 
states for the British products will have a major impact on the English economy. 
The common tariffs of the member states of the Union will apply in terms of its 
quality as third country. In the same vein, the reintroduction of foreign exchange in 
trade activities and the relocation of multinationals is another side effect of the 
hard Brexit. 
In the case of opting for a soft Brexit, the UK can retain its place in the European 
common market, benefiting further from its economic advantages (especially that 
over 50% of foreign investment in the United Kingdom are made by the EU 
Member States) and thus maintaining the legal homogeneity together with its other 
partners. We can assume that Britain will keep the provisions on free movement 
and competition practices. However, in the event of a “mild” exit from the EU, the 
negotiations will focus on the participation degree, in the sense that the relations 
between the EU-UK will be based either on a free total trade (i.e. people, goods, 
services and capital) or on only one of the economic resources. 
In particular, the European Union has concluded various agreements with the third 
countries, and the question arises as to whether it will follow one of these models 
or it will opt for an agreement “sur mesure” with Britain. (Guillard, 2016, p. 537) 
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Among the models that can be followed, we can mention: the Association 
Agreement; Neighborhood Agreement; sectorial agreements or partnership; 
agreement with the Member States of the European Economic Area and the 
Schengen area. 
The Association Agreement is that agreement between the European Union and a 
third country that creates a framework for cooperation between them 
(neighborhood agreement is generally similar to this). This Agreement is based on 
Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)1. 
Among the association agreements we can quote Euromed Partnership2, the Ankara 
Agreement3, the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and 
the European Union4. 
However, an agreement of association or neighborhood5 does not seem adapted in 
the case of soft Brexit as it is limited to certain areas of application and the UK 
would, following the wishes expressed by the British politicians, to retain full 
access to the common market, similar to the one before the referendum. 
Then another agreement model that can end is the sectorial one. Such an agreement 
is between the European Union and Switzerland. Among the main disadvantages 
we should mention the complexity and lack of coherence in the application. 
Therefore, the Union avoids to conclude sectorial agreements, as the one with 
Switzerland being concluded due to its specificity of this European country. 
The model of the agreement on the European Economic Area6 seems to be closer 
to the common interests between Britain and the European Union. This agreement 
is an economic union created in 1992 and consists of 31 European countries, all the 
                                                          
1 Art. 217 of TFEU “The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international 
organizations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedure.” 
2 The Euromed partnership concluded in 1995 at Barcelona between the EU and ten Mediterranean 
coastal states on diplomatic cooperation and financial aid for development. 
3 Ankara Agreement of 12 September 1963, as amended on November 23, 1970 and extended by the 
Ankara Protocol of 29 July 2005, is an association agreement between Turkey and the European 
Economic Community, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:21964A1229(01). 
4 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU was signed in June 1994 in 
Corfu for a period of 10 years extension, which entered into force on 1 December 1997, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/ legal-content / FR / TXT /? uri = CELEX: 31997D0800. 
5 In the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU aims at improving its relations with neighbors not 
only in terms of future adhesions, but also in improving security and stability policies and economic 
relations with its neighbors, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_fr. 
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=URISERV:em0024. 
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28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (all three of them are 
members of the European Association of Free Trade1). 
The agreement's main objective is the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons (the four freedoms of the EU). The agreement also includes rules 
governing the competition policy, consumer protection and education. We should 
mention that the agreement does not include in its text the rules to the common 
agricultural and fisheries policy, even if in its contents there are references in the 
exchange of agricultural and fishery products. 
In addition to the Community policy on agriculture and fisheries, in this agreement 
there are no longer the EU policy domains: customs union; trade policy; justice and 
home affairs; Common Security and Defense Policy; direct and indirect taxation; 
monetary union. 
Despite some advantages, it is possible for Britain not to join the European 
Economic Area without putting any condition. (Guillard, 2016) For example, if the 
UK wants to join should accept the free movement of persons, one of the reasons 
that determined the exit from the EU. 
All these political difficulties have led some to assert the doctrine as a possible 
solution for the negotiation of an exit from the EU around the common interests 
such as economic ones, without comprising, for example, the free movement of 
workers. (Rapoport, 2011, p. 155 and the next) Of course the European common 
market integrity would be put into question and many voices would oppose. 
From another perspective, the community norms would be in a constant motion by 
the desire to keep up with the evolution of society and to adapt to the new demands 
of globalization; the withdrawing agreement should be a template. Thus, the 
negotiated rules set out in its contents should be some general ones, leaving room 
for interpretation and flexibility, while being influenced by both interests of parties 
to the agreement. 
In such circumstances, we can ask if there is any prejudice to the legal autonomy of 
the European Union by the intrusion of a third State in the regulatory activity. The 
European legal system is one autonomous in the sense of the “the system of norms 
separated from other legal systems” (Simon, 2000, p. 213) for granting voting 
rights in the European legislative process of Great Britain, to the third country after 
                                                          
1 http://www.efta.int. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                      Vol. 13, no. 1/2017 
 
 36 
leaving the Union, it would be contrary to the legal order of the EU and 
incompatible with the depositions of the European treaties. 
A compromise variant is putting Great Britain in a privileged partner position of 
the EU by granting the observer state or accreditation of representatives to the 
European Parliament (Simon, 2000, p. 654 and the next) and the creation of a joint 
body to exert influence on the European Commission (Simon, 2000, p. 663 and the 
next). In other words, Britain will be able to refuse in extremis the implementation 
of the acquis communautaire in the national law, but without the right to vote in 
the legislative process, limiting to manifesting its interests through the mixed body 
upstream through the adoption of European standards. 
Thus the Great Britain would be satisfied only with the ability to make decisions on 
“shaping power” after a time when it had the right of decision in “making power”. 
The doctrine concluded in relation to this outcome as being a “paradox” (Guillard, 
2016), as by Brexit, the British citizens wanted independence and freedom from the 
European Union, which is contrary to its future status as third country in relation to 
the Union. 
 
5. Instead of Conclusions 
Without expressing a political position in the effects of leaving the European 
Union, we wish to conclude in the same vein in which we have presented this brief 
legal study on “British exit”, i.e. an objective view. Probably characteristically for 
a great former empire, the Britain's willingness “to sail solitarily” it will have 
incidences, as we have shown within the relationship with the European Union, and 
repercussions on external relations. (Vernier, 2016, p. 560) 
Through the membership in the European Union, the Great Britain was part of a 
mosaic of international organizations, agreements, treaties and partnerships with 
major third countries. For example we can mention: Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement with China (1985); Cooperation agreement with Brazil (1992); 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia (1997); Framework 
agreement for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration (2005); Partnerships 
with Japan (2001), with Latin America and the Caribbean (1999) or Africa (2000). 
All these diplomatic relations developed during the Union are part of the global 
strategy in the field of international policy and they are having a direct impact on 
the national economy of Member States, including the UK. It is understandable 
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that, by withdrawing from the EU, Britain loses membership to these implicit 
partnerships and agreements, and it will bilaterally negotiate if it wishes so. 
Another international strategy element that is nuanced are the positions of the 
European Union and of Great Britain “the Group of Twenty finance ministers and 
central bank governors” (G20). Created after the financial crises of 1990, the 
Group of 20 is composed of 19 countries plus the European Union and it is aimed 
at cooperation and economic development. G20 represents 85% of world trade, 
two-thirds of the world's population and over 90% of world gross GDP. Thus, due 
to Brexit, the EU loses a vote, Great Britain, the third country after exiting, but still 
a member of the G20, being able to vote independently by the Union’s option. 
In conclusion, at a time when Europe is undergoing through multiple crises 
(economic and social development, migration, armed conflict on its borders, 
terrorism, populism), the exit of Britain leaves behind a feeling of disappointment 
and maybe concern. However, the legal, economic and institutional consequences 
are difficult to determine at present, thus creating speculation and uncertainty 
instead. 
Moreover, the question asked by Paul Valéry after World War II in “La crise de 
l'esprit/The Crisis of the Mind”, if Europe is “in reality, a small head of the Asian 
continent” lies in our minds. And yet, we should not forget, “Europe was not made, 
we had the war.”1 
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